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Asset Allocation and Location over the Life Cycle with
Survival-Contingent Payouts
Wolfram J. Horneﬀ, Raimond H. Maurer, Olivia S. Mitchell, Michael Z. Stamos
Abstract
This paper shows how lifelong survival-contingent payouts can enhance investor
wellbeing in the context of a portfolio choice model which integrates uninsurable
labor income and asymmetric mortality expectations. Our model generates optimal
asset location patterns indicating how much to hold in liquid versus illiquid survival-
contingent payouts over the lifetime, and also asset allocation paths, showing how
to invest in stocks versus bonds. We conﬁrm that the investor will gradually move
money out of her liquid saving into survival-contingent assets to retirement and
beyond, thereby enhancing her welfare by as much as 50 percent. The results are also
robust to the introduction of uninsurable consumption shocks in housing expenses,
income ﬂows during the worklife and retirement, sudden changes in health status,
and medical expenses.
2
1 Introduction
This paper presents a dynamic model of rational consumption and portfolio choice
over the life cycle, in which uninsurable labor income and asymmetric mortality ex-
pectations are permitted to shape both the asset allocation and location decisions.
While prior studies have examined how mortality risk can inﬂuence investment de-
cisions, this is the ﬁrst analysis to include real-world life-contingent products that
hedge the mortality risk in a realistic calibrated life cycle framework.1 Speciﬁcally,
we model ﬁnancial contracts that permit the investor to trade oﬀ asset illiquidity in
exchange for an extra return known as the 'survival credit;' at the same time, the
individual is permitted to allocate her entire investment menu. Conﬁrming previous
ﬁndings, we show that the fraction of wealth invested in risky assets will optimally
decline with age. But we also show that the investor will gradually move her money
out of liquid saving into an illiquid survival-contingent payout account, to take ad-
vantage of the survival credit up to and beyond her retirement date. This strategy
can enhance welfare by as much as 50 percent.
Solving household ﬁnancial decision-making problems such as these is complex,
inasmuch as they involve long time horizons, stochastic investment opportunity sets,
shocks to consumption, and other uncertainties.2 Recent work has evaluated how
asset illiquidity can shape investor behavior, mainly focusing on housing and non-
tradable labor income.3 Less attention has been devoted to examining ﬁnancial
1Prior work includes Dus, Maurer, and Mitchell (2005); Gerrard, Haberman, and Vigna (2004);
Horneﬀ, Maurer, Mitchell, and Dus (2008); Kaplan (2006), Kapur and Orszag (1999); Kingston
and Thorp (2005); Milevsky (1998); Milevsky and Young (2002); Milevsky, Moore, and Young
(2006); Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown (1999); and Stabile (2003). A handful of
researchers compare variable payout life-contingent products to other asset classes on a 'stand-
alone' basis: for instance Blake, Cairns, and Dowd (2003) show that an equity-linked variable
annuity would appeal to many retirees, as compared to either a simple phased withdrawal plan
or a ﬁxed payout annuity. Feldstein and Ranguelova (2001) assume full annuitization at the
beginning of retirement with an equity exposure of 60 percent. Brown, Mitchell, and Poterba
(2001) demonstrate that variable payout annuities should be invested in inﬂation-indexed bonds,
though they ﬁnd that pure equity-linked annuities can generate greater utility than real annuities
for a broad range of risk aversion parameters. Using Monte Carlo simulation, Milevsky (2002)
analyzes the risk/return proﬁle of variable payout annuity payout streams and compares them to
ﬁxed and escalating annuities. He concludes that variable payout annuities may hedge inﬂation
better than escalating annuities. Koijen, Nijman, and Werker (2006) focus on the annuity risk
during the accumulation period when full annuitization is required at age 65. Interestingly, they
report that inﬂation and interest rate risk have only a marginal impact on the welfare eﬀects;
for this reason we do not model inﬂation and interest rate risk separately in what follows. None
of these previous studies focuses on the asset location versus allocation pattern over the entire
lifetime, allowing for income, health, and other consumption shocks, as here.
2For instance interest rate risk is examined in Brennan and Xia (2000) and Wachter (2003);
inﬂation risk is analyzed by Campbell and Viceira (2001) and Brennan and Xia (2002). Changing
risk premiums are considered in Brandt (1999), Campbell and Viceira (1999), Wachter (2002),
and Campbell, Chan, and Viceira (2003). The long run implications of stock market volatility
have been addressed by Chacko and Viceira (2006).
3Relevant prior work includes Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005); Cocco (2005); Yao and Zhang
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products that oﬀer investors the opportunity to give up liquidity in exchange for a
survival-contingent premium known as the survival credit. One exception is Richard
(1975) who elegantly modeled longevity insurance; however that work did not take
into account irreversibility of the longevity product purchase, labor income risk, or
borrowing constraints.
In what follows, we deﬁne a lifelong survival-contingent product as a ﬁnancial
contract between an insured person and an insurer which, in exchange for an initial
premium, pays a regular periodic beneﬁt as long as the purchaser is alive (Brown
et al., 2001). The essential attraction of such a payout beneﬁt is that, despite
uncertainty about one's remaining lifetime, the investor cannot outlive her assets
because she pools longevity risk across all purchasers in the pool (Mitchell et al.
1999). The provider invests the premiums in a portfolio of riskless and risky assets
which may be selected and directed by the buyer, and then pays to the retiree an
annual stream of income for life. As members of the pool die, the forfeited funds
are reallocated among survivors in the pool; this generates the survival credit that
rises with age. Of course, buying the payout annuity introduces illiquidity to the
investor's asset portfolio, as the initial premium cannot be recovered after purchase.
Theoretical groundwork on annuitization dates back as far as Yaari's (1965)
seminal study. Yaari suggested that a rational retiree lacking a bequest motive
would annuitize all her assets. In his framework, the investor is exposed only to
mortality risk (other sources of risk due to interest rates, stocks, and inﬂation are
omitted). In an important recent extension of that work, Davidoﬀ, Brown, and
Diamond (2005) conclude that a retiree will still fully annuitize ﬁnancial wealth in
the presence of a complete market if there is no bequest motive, when the net return
on the annuity is greater than that of the reference asset. Partial annuitization could
be optimal if the assumption about complete markets is relaxed, or if the investor
has a bequest motive. We extend prior literature by endogenizing the annuitization
decision and asset allocation of variable payout annuities in a dynamic portfolio
choice framework.
Introducing such survival-contingent products into a life cycle framework implies
that the investor now must make both asset location and allocation decisions, decid-
ing not only how much of the risky and riskless asset to buy, but also how and when
to move into irreversible life-contingent payout products over the lifetime. To this
end, we derive an optimal endogenous asset allocation and gradual annuitization
strategy for a risk-averse retiree facing a stochastic lifetime with uncertain labor in-
come, who can hold her wealth in riskless bonds or risky stocks. Our paper extends
previous work by augmenting the investor's asset menu to include so-called variable
(2005); Damon, Spatt, and Zhang (2001, 2004); and Gomes, Michaelides, and Polkovnichenko
(2006).
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payout life annuities where payments vary with stock returns. Such annuity pur-
chases are irrevocable, but the investor can optimally rebalance both her liquid and
her illiquid portfolios. In this way, we endogenously derive the optimal dynamic as-
set allocation path over the life cycle, taking into account the potential to gain from
the equity premium as well as the survival credit. Sensitivity analysis integrates
bequests and loads, as well as uninsurable income shocks (during the work life and
after retirement), housing, and medical expenses. Also we analyze the impact of
sudden deteriorations in health status.
Our ﬁndings may be summarized as follows. The investor will optimally begin
purchasing these survival-contingent payout annuities at least by the middle of her
worklife, and she will continue to do so until (in expectation) she is fully annuitized in
her late 70s. The investor will also hold a large fraction of equities in both her liquid
and illiquid accounts when young, while the fraction in equity falls with age; this
pattern is consistent with previous studies which have not incorporated the value-
added of life contingent holdings. Adding the survival-contingent asset is shown to
have a large positive impact on welfare. When the product is priced fairly, a 40-year
old investor lacking any bequest motive would be willing to give up as much as half of
her liquid wealth to gain access to the life-contingent product. Even with a moderate
bequest motive, she would be willing to give up almost one-third of her wealth to gain
access to the survival-contingent beneﬁt. In other words, variable payout annuities
provide a considerably higher standard of living, and those who survive capture
not only the equity premium but also share in the survival credit. Our results are
robust to uninsurable shocks in housing expenses, income, and medical expenses,
as well as a sudden severe deterioration in health status. The contribution of this
article is to solve a realistically calibrated life cycle model of consumption, portfolio
location, and portfolio allocation with illiquid variable life annuities while taking
into account important uninsurable risk factors. One study which comes closest to
ours is Horneﬀ, Maurer, Mitchell, and Stamos (2007), which evaluates the role of
a life contingent asset in a model of asset location and allocation. Nevertheless,
that work limits its attention to decisionmaking only during the retirement period.4
We contribute to the literature here by including the entire life cycle - from age 20
forward - and assess how labor income uncertainty and access to the survival credit
drives key decisions of interest. We also permit gradual timing of the purchase of
these survival-contingent assets as well as the asset allocation of both the liquid and
4For a review of prior literature see Horneﬀ, Maurer, Mitchell, and Dus (2008). One related
study by Horneﬀ, Maurer, and Stamos (2008a) derives an optimal annuitization strategy when
an investor is limited to holding bonds in her life contingent product; this generates a co-called
constant payout or ﬁxed annuity. But that work does not allow equities in the annuity portfolio,
as we do here.
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illiquid portfolios.5 In what follows, we brieﬂy describe our model. Next, we analyze
the asset location with and without product loads. We describe the pattern of asset
allocation. Subsequently we conduct a sensitivity analysis and examine the welfare
gains from expanding the asset space. A ﬁnal section concludes.
2 A Dynamic Asset Allocation and Location Model
2.1 Preference
We employ a time discrete model with t ∈ {0, ..., T + 1}, where t determines the
investor's adult age (computed as actual age minus 19). T is the investor's maximum
possible age. Individual preferences are characterized through the CRRA utility
function deﬁned over a single non-durable consumption good; the value function Vt
is recursively deﬁned as:
Vt =
C1−ρt
1−ρ + βEt
[
pstVt+1 + (1− pst)kB
1−ρ
t+1
1−ρ
]
and
VT =
C1−ρT
1−ρ + βET
[
k (BT+1)
1−ρ
1−ρ
] (1)
Here β is the time preference discount factor, k is the strength of the bequest
motive, and ρ is the level of risk aversion. Ct is the amount of wealth consumed in
period t and Bt+1 is the level of bequest in t + 1 if the investor dies between t and
t + 1. The individual has subjective probabilities pst that she survives until t + 1
given that she is alive in t. Below, we permit her subjective survival probability
to potentially diﬀer from the objective survival table assumed by the insurer. As
the investor gains utility from consumption and from leaving estate an additional
motive for liquid wealth is induced. Having a bequest motive k > 0 means that the
investor will always keep some wealth liquid (not annuitized), in order to be able to
bequeath the desired amount of wealth to potential heirs.
2.2 Labor Income
Several studies have recently highlighted the importance of including labor income
as a non-tradable asset6; in particular, stochastic labor income is shown to create
demand for buﬀer stock saving early in life. Including stochastic income into our
5See Charupat and Milevsky (2002), Koijen, Nijman, and Werker (2006), Browne, Milevsky, and
Salisbury (2003), Milevsky and Young (2006), and Milevsky and Young (2007). None of these en-
dogenize the asset location and allocation decisions dynamically, as in the present paper. Browne
et al. (2003) assess welfare losses from a stylized case where only ﬁxed/equity linked annuities
can be exchanged for each other.
6See Bodie, Merton, Samuelson (1992), Heaton and Lucas (1997), Viceira (2001), and Cocco,
Gomes, and Maenhout (2005).
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analysis is important in explaining the trade-oﬀ between the inﬂexibility created
by the survival-contingent beneﬁt versus the return-enhancing survival credit when
labor income is uncertain. We assume that the individual earns uninsurable real
labor income Yt during the accumulation phase (t ≤ K), where K is the retirement
adult age. This risky labor income follows the process (as in Cocco et al., 2005):
Yt = exp(f(t))PtUt, (2)
Pt = Pt−1Nt, (3)
where f(t) is a deterministic function of age to recover the hump-shaped income
proﬁle observed empirically. Pt is a permanent component with innovation Nt and
Ut is a transitory shock. The logarithms of Nt and Ut are normally distributed with
means zero and with volatilities σN , σU respectively. The shocks are assumed to be
uncorrelated. After retirement (t > K), we assume that the individual will receive
a constant pension beneﬁt payment of Yt = ζ exp(f(K))PK , where ζ is the constant
replacement ratio7.
2.3 Capital and Payout Annuity Market Parameters
The individual can invest via direct investments in the two ﬁnancial assets: riskless
bonds and risky stocks. The real bond gross return is denoted by Rf , and the real
risky stock return in t is Rt. The risky log-return lnRt is also normally distributed
with expected return µ and volatility σ. The term φn(φu) denotes the correlation
between the stock returns and the permanent (transitory) income shocks.
Capital market securities can be either accessed via liquid savings or the illiquid
annuities. But in contrast to direct stock or bond investments, annuities cannot
be sold by the individual, which makes them irreversible and creates illiquidity for
purchasers. Turning to the variable annuity, this is an insurance contract between
an annuitant and an insurer; the purchaser receives a pre-speciﬁed number of fund
units nt conditional on survival in each period t > 0. When the price of a fund
unit at time t is Zat , the survival-contingent income received from this annuity is
Pˆt = ntZ
a
t , t ∈ (0, ..., T ). To receive this income stream, the annuitant must pay the
7Here we focus on asset allocation decisions; future work might determine the retirement age K
and labor supply endogenously.
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insurer an initial premium A, computed according to 8:
At = (1 + δ)Z
a
t (t)nt+1(t)
T∑
s=t+1
pa(t, s)
(1 + AIR)s−t−1
, (4)
where δ is the expense factor, pa(t, s) =
s−1∏
t
pat is the cumulative conditional
survival probability for an individual age t to survive until age s, and AIR is the
so-called assumed interest rate. The single period conditional probability pat may
be permitted to diﬀer from the individual's subjective survival probability, pst , if we
wish to model asymmetric mortality beliefs (as below). The AIR9 determines how
the number of fund units evolves over time, according to nt = n1
(
1
(1+AIR)
)t−1
. One
can think of the AIR as the deterministic shrinkage rate for the number of fund
units the individual is supposed to receive. 10
The evolutionary equation for the price of the fund unit can be written as follows:
Zt+1 = ZtR
a
t+1, (5)
where Rat+1 = (Rf + pi
a
t (Rt+1 − Rf )) is the growth rate of the underlying fund and
where pia is the stock fraction inside the variable annuity. The investment return
will be random when the fund is invested in risky stocks. Accordingly, the income
evolution of a single annuity purchased previously can be recursively expressed as:
Pˆt+1 =
PˆtR
a
t+1
1 + AIR
. (6)
This formulation shows that the annuity payout evolves according to a multiplicative
random walk: it rises when the fund return Rat+1 > 1+AIR, decreases when R
a
t+1 <
1+AIR, and is constant when Rat+1 equals the AIR. Sellers do not generally permit
changing the AIR after the annuity is purchased, implying that the annuity market
is incomplete. Nevertheless, the investor can still purchase new annuities throughout
the lifecycle, in order to align the income proﬁle of all purchased annuities to her
8This expression shows that the discount rate is higher than the simple market return since
[pa(t, s)]−1 > 1; this additional return increment is referred to as the survival credit. It arises from
allocating deceased members' remaining assets among the surviving member of the insurance pool
9The assumed interest rate could in practice be time dependent but, in keeping with prior studies
and industry practice, here we assume it is constant. For instance, a 4 percent AIR is widespread
in the US insurance industry (c.f. the Vanguard and TIAA-CREF variable payout annuity web-
sites); furthermore, the US National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) stipulates
that the AIR may not exceed a nominal 5 percent.
10The ﬁxed annuity can be deﬁned as similar to the usual annuity factor whereby the riskless
discount factor is replaced by the AIR
∑T
s=1
pa(t,t+s)
(1+AIR)s−1 . In the case where the fund invests only
in riskless bonds, we obtain the classical result for constant payout annuities: A0 =
∑T
s=1
pa(t,t+s)
(Rtf )
s
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preferences.11
2.4 Wealth Accumulation
The household is assumed to decide annually how to spread her cash on hand,
Wt, across bonds, stocks, variable payout annuities, and consumption. Her budget
constraint is:
Wt = St + At + Ct, (7)
where St represents liquid saving comprised by her liquid bond and stock invest-
ments; At is the amount that the investor pays for annuity premiums in the current
period; and Ct represents consumption. Her cash on hand one period later is given
by:
Wt+1 = StR
s
t+1 + Lt+1 + Yt+1, (8)
where RSt+1 = (Rf + pi
s
t (Rt+1 − Rf )) is growth rate of liquid saving; pist denotes
the fraction of liquid saving St invested in risky stocks; Lt+1 is the sum of annuity
payments which the investor receives from all previously purchased annuities; and
Yt+1 represents labor income. The sum of all payments from previous annuities
purchased in u ∈ 0, 1, ..., t is:
Lt+1 =
t∑
u=0
Zt+1(u)nt+1(u) (9)
The price process of fund units of the annuity purchased at t = u can be written as:
Zt+1(u) = Zt(u)(Rf + pi
a
t (Rt+1 −Rf )), Zu(u) = 1; (10)
where piat is the stock fraction at date t inside the purchased annuities. Substituting
(10) and (4) into (9) yields the recursive deﬁnition of the payout evolution:
Lt+1 =
 Lt
(1 + AIR)
+ At
(
T∑
s=t+1
pa(t, s)
(1 + AIR)s−t−1
)−1 (Rf + piat (Rt+1 −Rf )), (11)
with Zu(u) = 1;
The recursive intertemporal budget restriction can be obtained as follows by
substituting (7) and (11) into (8):
11More discussion of the role of the AIR on payout proﬁles appears in Horneﬀ, Maurer, Mitchell,
and Stamos (2007).
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Wt+1 =
[
(Wt − Ct − At) +
(
Lt
1+AIR
+ At
(∑T
s=t+1
pa(t,s)
(1+AIR)s−t−1
)−1)]
Rf+[
(Wt − Ct − At)pist +
(
Lt
1+AIR
+ At
(∑T
s=t+1
pa(t,s)
(1+AIR)s−t−1
)−1)
piat
]
(Rt+1 −Rf ))
+Yt+1
(12)
If the retiree were to die at t + 1, her estate remaining would be given by Bt+1 =
St(Rf + pi
S
t (Rt+1 − Rf ). Furthermore, and consistent with the real world, retirees
are precluded from borrowing against future labor, pension, and annuity income, by
imposing the following non-negativity restrictions:
St, At, pi
a
t , (1− piat ), pist , (1− pist ) ≥ 0 (13)
2.5 Numerical Solution of the Optimization Problem
In what follows, we normalize by permanent income in order to reduce the complex-
ity of the problem by one state variable. We note the normalized variables by the
lower-case letters of the variables already introduced:
wt = st + at + ct (14)
st, at ≥ 0 (15)
wt+1 =
[
st +
(
lt
1+AIR
+ at
(∑T
s=t+1
pa(t,s)
(1+AIR)s−t−1
)−1)]
Rf (Nt+1)
−1+ if t < K[
stpi
s
t +
(
lt
1+AIR
+ at
(∑T
s=t+1
pa(t,s)
(1+AIR)s−t−1
)−1)
piat
]
(Rt+1 −Rf )(Nt+1)−1
+exp(f(t+ 1))Ut+1
wt+1 =
[
st +
(
lt
1+AIR
+ at
(∑T
s=t+1
pa(t,s)
(1+AIR)s−t−1
)−1)]
Rf+ if t ≥ K[
stpi
s
t +
(
lt
1+AIR
+ at
(∑T
s=t+1
pa(t,s)
(1+AIR)s−t−1
)−1)
piat
]
(Rt+1 −Rf )
+ζexp(f(K))
(16)
The optimization problem is then given by:
max
{ct,at,pist ,piat }Tt
v0, (17)
where v0 is the normalized value of utility from future consumption and the optimiza-
tion problem is subject to the restrictions listed above. Since analytical solutions to
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this kind of problem do not exist, we solve the problem in a three-dimensional state
space {w, l, t} by backward induction (see the Technical Appendix). Although we
assume CRRA preferences, cash on hand w cannot be omitted as a state variable
because illiquid annuities are included in the analysis. It is also necessary to include
the sum of current annuity payouts l as a state variable, because once purchased,
annuities can no longer be sold. Finally, the optimal policy depends on the retiree's
age because this inﬂuences the price of newly purchased life annuities as well as the
present value of her remaining lifetime income.
2.6 Calibration
The individual lifespan is modeled from age 20 to age 100 (T = 81); retirement
begins at age 65 (K = 46). As a result, the worklife can be, at most, 45 years long;
the maximum length of the retirement phase is 36 years. Preference parameters are
set to values standard in the life-cycle literature, including a coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion ρ of 5, a discount factor β = 0.96, and initially, a zero bequest motive
(k = 0). In sensitivity analyses we do allow positive bequest preferences (k = 2) as
empirical evidence on bequest motives is ambiguous (Bernheim et al., 1985; Hurd,
1987). Parameter values of labor and pension income processes are set in accord
with Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005); our base case sets the deterministic labor
income function f(t) and volatility parameters for transitory and permanent labor
income shocks (σu = 0.30 and σn = 0.1) to represent households with high school
but no college education. The replacement ratio for Social Security pensions (but
exclusive of voluntary annuitization) is set at 68.2 percent. Mean equity returns
are set at µ = 4.41 percent and volatility σs = 16.86 percent, equivalent to an
expected return of 6 percent and standard deviation of 18 percent; the correlation
between stock returns and permanent (transitory) income shocks φn (φu) is zero.
The assumed interest rate (AIR) is set to a real 2 percent, as is the case in practice.
With respect to the additional costs of buying annuities, the base case sets the
load at zero and assumes that annuities are priced actuarially fairly by equating
conditional survival probabilities of the investor and the insurer (as per the 2000
Population Basic mortality table). In extensions, we permit positive loads with the
expense factor δ set to 2.38 percent (in line with industry leaders such as Vanguard);
and we implement asymmetric mortality distributions by using the 1996 US Annuity
2000 Aggregate Basic for annuity pricing and the 2000 Population Basic mortality
table to compute the investor's expected utility.
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3 Asset Location and Allocation
3.1 Optimal Asset Location
In what follows, we ﬁrst consider no-load survival-contingent products. In such a
setting, we can isolate how stochastic labor income creates the need for liquid assets
early in the life cycle - even without a bequest motive (k = 0). We show how
the individual's need for such precautionary saving can inﬂuence her demand for
annuitization, and how it delays the date at which full annuitization occurs. After
deriving the optimal policy for the no-bequest case, we then show how introducing a
moderate bequest motive (k = 2) induces further demand for liquid saving near the
end of life. Subsequently, we discuss how positive loads and asymmetric mortality
probabilities alter these predictions.
No Loads. To illustrate the range of asset location and allocation strategies,
we next plot the optimal policies by age and cash on hand. Figure (1) illustrates
how the individual would act at each age, assuming she receives no payouts from
previously-purchased annuities; subsequently we allow for gradual annuitization. 12
Panel (a) of Figure (1) shows that the investor with no bequest motive will optimally
purchase zero load life annuities at all ages with her net cash on hand. Because of
the need for precautionary saving to oﬀset adverse stochastic labor income shocks,
the individual will also invest some portion of her liquid assets until about age
65. After that, all cash will be used to purchase life annuities, since she faces less
labor income uncertainty and the survival credit grows at older ages. It is also of
interest to note that wealthier people optimally devote more of their cash on hand to
annuities. Given their higher wealth levels, less liquidity is needed to protect against
labor income shocks; further, their higher annuity payouts compensate them for this
illiquidity.
To illustrate how bequests might alter the analysis, Panel (b) indicates results
for k = 2. As before, we assume that the individual receives no payouts from
previously-purchased annuities. Now she will need to keep more money in liquid
form, in case she experiences labor income shocks or early death. Consequently she
will optimally reserve a larger portion of her net cash on hand to meet these goals
(panel b). Nevertheless, similar to the no bequest case, partial annuitization is still
optimal, and in fact it could begin as early as age 20 if her cash on hand is high
enough. Interestingly, the annuitization fraction still exceeds 70 percent of net cash
on hand for the wealthiest individual, but it is a decreasing function of age because
the urgency of the bequest motive at older ages oﬀsets the rising survival credit.
12Accordingly, Figure (1) cleanly illustrates the demand for de novo liquid versus illiquid annuity
investments. The blank area in the lower right corner of panel (a) of Figure (1) represents the
region of the state space in which it is optimal to consume 100 percent of cash on hand.
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Figure 1: Illustrative Optimal Dynamic Asset Location Outcomes Assuming
No Loads vs. Loads (top-bottom), No Bequest vs. Moderate Bequest Cases
(left-right). These ﬁgures represent optimal policies for annuity purchases, as a function
of cash on hand (w) and age; no prior annuitization is assumed (l = 0). For instance, in
Panel (a), a 20-year old with no bequest motive and with cash on hand w = 200 would
spend 70 percent of her net cash on annuities, and the rest on liquid investments. Panel (b)
shows that the 20-year old individual having a moderate bequest motive (k = 2) and the
same cash on hand (w = 200) would annuitize 40 percent. In Panel (c), the individual at
age 20 with no bequest motive and with cash on hand w = 200 would spend zero percent of
her wealth on annuities and devote all to ﬁnancial investments. Panel (d) shows that this
individual would also hold 100 percent liquid investments. Note: Calculations are based
on backward optimization of the value function given in (1). The base case individual
has CRRA utility with ρ = 5, β = 0.96; for the computations without loads: survival
probabilities are taken from the corresponding population mortality table to calculate
utility and price annuities. Loads for annuities are set to zero; for the computations with
loads: Survival probabilities are taken from the US 1996 Annuity 2000 mortality table
for females to price annuities and from the corresponding population mortality table to
calculate utility. Annuity loads are set to 2.38 percent. Yearly real stock returns are i.i.d.
log-normal distributed with mean 6 percent and standard deviation 18 percent. The real
interest rate and AIR are set to 2 percent.
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At low wealth levels, by contrast, the annuitization fraction rises until the worker
retires; after that date, the pattern is complicated by the oﬀsetting eﬀects of the
rising survival credit, on the one hand, and the desire to leave a bequest, on the
other.
Loads. Next we explore how adding loads and mortality asymmetries inﬂuences
optimal location choices. In particular, we assume that the annuity provider charges
a front load of 2.38 percent to account for administration, mortality changes, and
reserves.13 Further, we acknowledge that the annuity provider is aware of the fact
that healthier-than-average people are more inclined to purchase annuities (Mc-
Carthy and Mitchell, 2002). This is implemented by taking survival probabilities
from the US female 1996 Annuity 2000 mortality table to price annuities and from
the corresponding population mortality table to calculate utility. Results appear in
Figure (1) panel (c) and panel (d) for l = 0 (no preexisting annuities) and assum-
ing no bequest motive (left side) versus a moderate bequest rationale (right hand
side). In particular, adding loads and asymmetric information induces the individ-
ual to defer annuitization to around the age of 50. That is, she waits until the
survival credit is high enough to overcome the implicit and explicit costs related
to the annuity purchase. Nevertheless, an individual without a bequest motive will
fully annuitize after age 65, whereas she would only move to about a 60 percent
annuitization strategy if she had suﬃcient wealth and a moderate bequest motive
(panels c versus d).
3.2 Optimal Asset Allocation and the Impact of Human Cap-
ital
We next turn to a discussion of how the uncertain human capital inﬂuences the
optimal allocation and location patterns. Figure (2) shows illustrative optimal stock
fractions in the combined annuity and ﬁnancial wealth portfolio for the no load, no
bequest case. Panel (a) provides the stock fraction as a function of age and cash on
hand (w), and it can be seen that he stock fraction falls with the level of cash on
hand (w). The rationale is that bonds are perceived as a closer substitute for human
capital than stocks. In turn, the decline in human capital over time is compensated
for by reducing the stock fraction in order to purchase bonds.
Thus far, we have assumed that the individual has no income from pre-existing
annuities (l = 0); next we allow for gradual annuitization. This means that she
can purchase new annuities as long as the budget constraint permits it, in which
case her asset allocation decision will depend on how much annuity income the
individual is already receiving. Accordingly another dimension must be added to
13This corresponds to the industry average according to Vanguard.
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Figure 2: Illustrative Optimal Stock Fractions in the Combined Annuity and
Financial Wealth Portfolios. These ﬁgures represent the relationship between the
individual's age and the optimal stock fraction in her combined annuity and ﬁnancial asset
holdings. The latter is deﬁned as the stock fraction of her expected annuity wealth PV
(the present value of the remaining annuity payouts) plus the stock fraction of her ﬁnancial
wealth s, as a percent of ﬁnancial plus annuity wealth . Panel (a) shows how the total stock
fraction varies with age and cash on hand w; panel (b) shows how it varies with age and
pre-existing annuity payments l. Note: Calculations are based on backward optimization
of the value function given in (1). The base case individual has CRRA utility with ρ = 5, β
= 0.96; the computations are done for the no load, no bequest-case: survival probabilities
are taken from the corresponding population mortality table to calculate utility and price
annuities. Loads for annuities are set to zero. Yearly real stock returns are i.i.d. log-normal
distributed with mean 6 percent and standard deviation 18 percent. The real interest rate
and AIR are set to 2 percent.
the presentation. Panel (b) of Figure (2) shows the stock fraction as a function
of age and payouts from pre-existing annuities (l). The eﬀects are quite similar to
panel (a). The more payouts one has, the less one must be invested in equity to
achieve the optimal split of augmented wealth. However, the stock fraction drops
much faster for the annuity payouts than for the level of cash on hand. Panel (b) also
shows the age eﬀect due to the decreasing human capital. The older the individual,
the lower is the stock fraction.
3.3 Expected Asset Allocation and Location
Next we conduct a Monte Carlo analysis of 100,000 life cycles to depict the expected
evolution of the investments in illiquid stocks and bonds (variable annuities), and
liquid equity and bonds, assuming that the individual behaves optimally over her
lifetime. Figure (3) traces expected asset allocation patterns for the same four cases,
with and without bequest motives and loads. For the no-load-no-bequest case (panel
a), the worker holds all her assets in non-annuitized form so as to protect against
labor income shocks; her liquid saving is fully invested in stocks. After about age
13
60, she then shifts her holdings into an illiquid annuitized portfolio, after which time
she no longer has liquid wealth. She also begins to shift her optimal asset allocation
from illiquid stocks to illiquid bonds, because of her declining human capital. At
older ages, she would hold some 40 percent of her annuity portfolio in equities,
in expectation. Interestingly, only a few bonds are ever held outside the annuity
portfolio. Including a bequest motive, as in Panel (b), we see that once again, the
bulk of her portfolio at younger ages is held in equity, but now the share of liquid
stocks is higher. Further, after about age 35, she again optimally shifts into liquid
bonds in order to safely accumulate her bequest during her early years when her
labor income is quite uncertain. Her fraction of wealth held in annuities now rises
to age 75, when about three-quarters of total wealth is annuitized. After that point,
her fraction of annuitized wealth shrinks, since survival probabilities decrease with
age. The fraction of liquid wealth becomes 100 percent again at the very end of the
life cycle. Overall, it is interesting that, with or without a bequest, the individual
will hold similar cumulative stock holdings in liquid and illiquid wealth. What is
diﬀerent is that without a bequest, almost no bonds are held outside the annuity.
Having a bequest motive also leads the individual to invest substantial assets in
liquid bonds. Expected asset allocations are displayed in panel (c) and (d) of Figure
(3) for the case with loads and mortality asymmetry. The most notable diﬀerence
is that now liquid bonds play a much larger role in the no-bequest (panel c) and
moderate bequest cases (panel b). Having a bequest motive means that liquid bonds
will play an important role all the way to the oldest possible age. At age 80, for
instance, the individual would be expected to hold about 70 percent of her wealth in
a variable annuity which is about two-thirds equities; her remaining non-annuitized
wealth would be mainly in bonds.
4 Sensitivity Analysis
We next ask how sensitive the results are to additional liquidity shocks. We use the
load, no-bequest case as the benchmark, and we ask how, at ages 30, 50, 60, and 80,
the baseline expected asset allocations compare with scenarios that include retire-
ment income shocks, housing expenditures, and health shocks. In the benchmark
case, liquidity shocks before retirement are the result of labor income risk (for more
detail see the Technical Appendix).
Risky Retirement Income Streams. To analyze the impact of adding risk to the
retirement income stream on the need for liquidity reserves, we multiply what was
previously a constant retirement income ﬂow Yt = ζexp(f(K))PK by a transitory
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Figure 3: Optimal Expected Asset Allocation Over the Life Cycle Assuming
No Loads vs. Loads (top-bottom), No Bequest vs. Moderate Bequest Cases
(left-right). Panel (a) plots the expected trajectory for the fraction held in stocks inside
the annuity (illiquid) and outside the annuity (liquid) for a female with a maximum life
span of age 100, having no initial endowment and no bequest; in panel (b) the individual
has a bequest motive (k = 2). In Panel (c), the individual has no bequest motive while
in panel (d) the individual has a bequest motive of (k=2). In panel (a) and panel (b)
annuities have zero loads, while in panel (c) and (d) annuities are loaded. Note: Expected
values are computed by simulating 100,000 life-cycle paths based on the optimal policies
derived by the numerical optimization. The base case individual has CRRA utility with ρ
= 5, β = 0.96; for the computations without loads: survival probabilities are taken from
the corresponding population mortality table to calculate utility and price annuities. Loads
for annuities are set to zero; for the computations with loads: Survival probabilities are
taken from the US 1996 Annuity 2000 mortality table for females to price annuities and
from the corresponding population mortality table to calculate utility. Annuity loads are
set to 2.38 percent. Yearly real stock returns are i.i.d. log-normal distributed with mean
6 percent and standard deviation 18 percent. The real interest rate and AIR are set to 2
percent.
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log-normal iid. shock:
Ut,t>K ∼ LN
(
−1
2
σ2R, σ
2
R
)
. (18)
We set the volatility of retirement income equal to the volatility during the
worklife σr = σu = 0.3. The results (Table (1), Row 2) show that the individual will
hold only slightly more liquid wealth, but the optimal fraction of annuitized wealth
is around 95 percent. This result indicates that transitory retirement income shocks
can largely be absorbed by the annuity income stream. Also the asset allocation
does not diﬀer substantially from that of the benchmark case.
To explore the sensitivity of results to permanent retirement income shocks, we
allow for a disastrous permanent retirement income downturn of 75 percent which
occurs with a probability ψ of 5 percent in each year, but it can only happen once.
14 Such a shock can be thought of as signiﬁcant background risk, or it could be
conceived of as large medical bills incurred late in the life cycle. Row 3 of Table (1)
shows that annuitization rates in this scenario are similar to the benchmark case.
What responds, however, is the asset allocation inside the variable annuity: now the
bond fraction inside the variable annuity is substantially larger than before. In other
words, the individual will adjust for an anticipated bad income draw by increasing
the portion of ﬁxed permanent annuity income.
Housing Expenditures. Next we introduce shocks to housing expenses by em-
ploying the polynomial function estimated by Gomes and Michaelides (2005) from
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Speciﬁcally, housing expenses ht, deﬁned as
the annual mortgage and rent payments relative to labor income Y , are given by:
ht = max(Aˆ+ Bˆ1 · age+ Bˆ2 · age2 + Bˆ3 · age3, 0), (19)
where Aˆ = 0.703998, Bˆ1 = -0.0352276, Bˆ2 = 0.0007205, and Bˆ3 = -0.0000049 (we
truncate ht to zero for age = 80). As Row (4) of Table (1) shows, such deterministic
housing expenses reduces the annuitization fraction by 2 percentage points compared
to the benchmark case. If we add a stochastic component to the housing expenditure
consisting of a lognormal shock:
Ht ∼ LN
(
−1
2
σ2h, σ
2
h
)
. (20)
with σh = 0.25, then disposable income is now given as (1− hˆt)Yt where:
hˆt = htHt (21)
14This type of sensitivity analysis is similar to that carried out in Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout
(2005) where they analyzed the impact of disastrous events on the asset allocation decision
including stocks and bonds.
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Change in Cumulative Survival Rates if Health Shock Happens at Age 65
Figure 4: Illustration of Health Shock at Age 65. To model the drop in survival
rates, we assume that the individual's force of mortality becomes 4 times the force of
mortality implied by the 1996 US Annuitant Mortality table if a health shock occurs.
It is shown in Table (1), Row 5, that the fraction of annuitized wealth is again quite
robust to this innovation. In Row (6), we combine both the transitory income and
housing shocks (equations 18 and 20). Remarkably, the fraction of annuitized wealth
never drops more than 10 percent below that of the benchmark case.
Health Shocks. To implement health shocks, we assume that, in each year during
retirement, a sudden decline in the survival rate and a permanent 75 percent drop
in retirement beneﬁts occurs with a 5 percent probability. This scenario would be
equivalent to a sudden severe deterioration in health status accompanied by a spike
in medical or nursing home costs. To model the poorer survival rate, we assume that
the individual's force of mortality becomes 4 times that in the 1996 US Annuitant
Mortality table (see Figure 4). Thus, survival rates after a health shock can be
expressed as pst = (p
a
t )
4; if, for instance, a health shock occured at age 65, the
remaining expected lifetime would fall from 22 to 12 years. Clearly a lower survival
rates means makes annuities less attractive. Nevertheless, the resulting reduction in
the fraction of wealth annuitized is remarkably small (Table 1, row 7).
5 Expected Life Cycle Proﬁles
Next we turn to an analysis of the expected evolution of key decision variables over
the life cycle; results are from a Monte Carlo simulation of 100,000 life cycles.
No Loads. First we assume no loads, and show in Figure (5) that expected
consumption rises remarkably steeply with age - in fact, so steeply (in expectation)
that the retiree's living standard greatly exceeds that she had during her worklife
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Figure 5: Optimal Expected Consumption, Labor Income, Saving, and Annuity
Purchases Over the Life Cycle Assuming No Loads vs. Loads (top-bottom),
No Bequest vs. Moderate Bequest Cases (left-right). Panel (a) plots expected
trajectories for a female with a maximum life span of age 100, having no initial endowment,
in panel (b) the individual has a bequest motive (k = 2). In Panel (c), the individual has
no bequest motive while in panel (d) the individual has a bequest motive of (k = 2). In
panel (a) and panel (b) annuities have zero loads, while in panel (c) and (d) annuities are
loaded. Note: Expected values are computed by simulating 100,000 life-cycle paths based
on the optimal policies derived by the numerical optimization. The base case individual
has CRRA utility with ρ = 5, β = 0.96; for the computations without loads: survival
probabilities are taken from the corresponding population mortality table to calculate
utility and price annuities. Loads for annuities are set to zero; for the computations with
loads: Survival probabilities are taken from the US 1996 Annuity 2000 mortality table
for females to price annuities and from the corresponding population mortality table to
calculate utility. Annuity loads are set to 2.38 percent. Yearly real stock returns are i.i.d.
log-normal distributed with mean 6 percent and standard deviation 18 percent. The real
interest rate and AIR are set to 2 percent.
(panel a). Having a rising consumption proﬁle might seem counterintuitive given the
investor's time preference, but it is driven by the survival credit generating rising
payouts from her previously-purchased variable annuities. Of course these are, in
turn, counterbalanced by their illiquidity; people cannot borrow against annuity
payout streams so they cannot use annuity payouts to smooth their consumption
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paths earlier in life.
We also see that, when she has no bequest motive, the individual accumulates
rather low amounts of precautionary saving to cover transitory income shocks up
to age 65 (panel a). She begins buying annuities in her early 20's, and her long-
term permanent income risk is diversiﬁed by the annuity income. Annuity income
also cushions the drop in income when transitioning to retirement. After age 65,
her annuity payouts are suﬃciently high that no liquid wealth is needed. In the
moderate bequest case (panel b), once again pre-retirement consumption is lower
than post-retirement consumption which is mainly ﬁnanced by variable annuities
- though now, it is optimal to postpone a ﬁrst annuity purchase to age 27. The
bequest motive drives a higher demand for liquid wealth; now, the ﬁrst 7 years of
the work life are used to build up an estate to bequeath to the heirs, instead of
purchasing annuities.
Including Loads. Turning to the impact of loads, it is clear that even without
a bequest motive, saving levels now surge to much higher levels. Obviously the
uncertainty of labor income cannot explain this diﬀerence; rather, the individual
now accumulates liquid wealth in order to ﬁnance consumption until such time that
the survival credit improves enough to compensate her for the additional annuity
loads. This occurs around age 50, and later she moves all her saving into annuities.
Having a bequest motive moderates the shift to annuities, so as to preserve an estate
on the individual's death.
6 Welfare Analysis
To assess how consumers might value access to payout annuity products, compared
to the asset universe which includes only stock and bond investments, we now turn
to a welfare analysis. Speciﬁcally, we compute the equivalent increase in ﬁnancial
wealth that would be needed to boost the investor's total expected utility given no
access to annuity products, to the level she could attain with access to the survival-
contingent assets.15
Table (2) reports the wealth equivalent values of calculations undertaken for
every year of life remaining, conditional on survival, for both a 40-year old and an
80-year old female. The equivalent increase in ﬁnancial wealth needed to compensate
the investor if she had no access to a ﬁxed annuity appears in the left column, and
for variable annuity products in the right column. The results show, ﬁrst, that
all individuals are substantially better oﬀ if they can access survival-contingent
products, be they ﬁxed or variable in nature (Rows 1 and 2). Second, the utility
15To compare ﬁxed and variable annuities on an equal basis, we set the AIR to 2 percent and
derive the respective optimal policies.
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gains are greatest for variable payout annuities. For instance, at age 40, an individual
facing realistic insurance loads but having no bequest motive would value a ﬁxed
annuity at 12 percent of her wealth, compared to having no annuity access, and a
variable annuity at 38 percent (Row 3). If she also has a bequest motive (Row 4),
the value of having access to a ﬁxed annuity is less, at 10 percent, but still half as
much again, 15 percent, for the variable annuity. Obviously, the investor would be
much better oﬀ if the insurance were priced fairly. For instance, if a government
could mandate no-load annuities, someone with no bequest motive would be willing
to pay 21 percent of her wealth to gain access to a ﬁxed annuity and 53 percent for
a variable annuity (Row 1). It is also interesting that welfare gains for the 80 year
old lacking a bequest motive are lower, compared to the 40 year old, but they still
remain substantial: access to a variable annuity product is worth 28 percent of her
wealth in the actuarially fair case.
7 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the portfolio choice literature by integrating survival-
contingent payout products in the investor's menu, while incorporating uninsurable
shocks to housing, medical expenses, health, and income during the worklife and
retirement. We generate optimal asset location patterns, indicating how much to
hold in liquid versus illiquid assets over the lifetime, and also asset allocation paths,
explaining how to optimally invest in stocks versus bonds. By contrast, prior stud-
ies on annuitization strategies have focused mainly on ﬁxed annuities, or products
where only nominal bonds are held inside the illiquid annuity investment. Accord-
ingly, these studies have not acknowledged the substantial welfare-enhancing aspect
of variable payout annuities. We show that the investor will gradually move money
from her liquid saving into annuities as she nears retirement, and indeed she con-
tinues to do so until her late 70s. She will also optimally hold a high percentage of
equities in both the liquid and illiquid accounts while young, with the fraction in eq-
uity falling with age. This pattern is consistent with previous studies which have not
integrated the survival credit of life-contingent holdings. Sensitivity analysis shows
that uninsurable shocks increase the preference for liquid savings only marginally. In
addition, access to annuities allows the individual to capture the equity premium as
well as the survival credit, which enhances her welfare substantially. If the product
is fairly priced, a 40-year old investor with no bequest motive is willing to give up as
much as half of her liquid wealth to gain access to the life-contingent product. Even
with a moderate bequest motive, she would be willing to give up almost one-third
of her wealth to gain access to annuities. When reasonable loads and asymmetric
mortality distributions are included, the utility gains are still worth over one-third
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of ﬁnancial wealth. In other words, this payout product provides a considerably
higher standard of living for those who survive, as they can beneﬁt not only from
the equity premium but they will also share in the survival credit. In future work we
hope to extend this analysis in several directions. One possible addition would be
to include inﬂation and interest rate risk while keeping real annuities and including
nominal payout annuities as well. It may also be worthwhile to endogenize labor
supply. Housing might be modeled endogenously to understand how much the indi-
vidual saves in housing vis-a´-vis life annuities. Life insurance could be included in
order to understand how annuities are aﬀected by the interference of bequest and life
insurance. In general, however, it is clear that introducing survival-contingent pay-
outs into the life cycle framework adds many interesting dimensions to the investor's
asset location and allocation decisions.
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8 Appendix (A): Technical Details
The irreversibility of the annuity purchase translates into a real option problem.
Due to the irreversibility it is necessary to record how much annuities have been
purchased to date. We are required to introduce an additional state variable for
the base case. In order to reduce the problem by one state variable, we normalize
every evolutionary equation by the permanent income component which itself is a
state variable. For solving the gradual annuitization problem after omitting the
permanent income component, it is necessary to construct a three dimensional state
space because the optimal policies still depend on three state variables: normalized
cash on hand wt which represents the level of liquid ﬁnancial wealth, normalized
annuity payouts from previously purchased annuities lt, and age t. The continuous
state variables cash on hand wt and annuity payouts lt have to be discretized and
the only true discrete state variable left is age t. For most computations, we use a
45x45x81 grid with a log-scale for both the normalized wealth and for normalized
annuity payout. Moving backward along the t dimension we calculate the optimal
policy and the value of the value function for each grid point. After applying a series
of monotonic transformation and normalizing the value function by the permanent
income, we can compute the new expectation operator as:
∫∫∫
(−pst(−νt+1)1−ρ + (1− pst)k b
1−ρ
t+1
1−ρ )N
1−ρ
t+1 · if t < K
ϕ(Nt+1, Ut+1, Rt+1)dNt+1dUt+1dRt+1∫
(−pst(−νt+1)1−ρ + (1− pst)k b
1−ρ
t+1
1−ρ )ϕ(Rt+1)dRt+1 if t ≥ K
(22)
The expectation operator is computed by resorting to Gaussian quadrature inte-
gration and the optimization is done by numerical constrained minimization. We
inter(extra-)polate the policy and value functions for points which do not lie on
the grid. Therefore, we compute the policy functions for gradual annuitization
piS(w; l; t), piA(w; l; t), pr(w; l; t), c(w; l; t) and the value function v(w; l; t) by cubic-
splines interpolation.
For the case of consumption shocks in retirement, we change the computation of
the expectation operator to:
∫∫
(−pst(−νt+1)1−ρ + (1− pst)k b
1−ρ
t+1
1−ρ )N
1−ρ
t+1 · if t ≥ K
ϕ(Ut+1, Rt+1)dUt+1dRt+1
(23)
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For the housing shocks, we have to alter the expectation operator as follows:
∫∫∫∫
(−pst(−νt+1)1−ρ + (1− pst)k b
1−ρ
t+1
1−ρ )N
1−ρ
t+1 · if t < K
ϕ(Nt+1, Ut+1, Rt+1, Ht+1)dNt+1dUt+1dRt+1dHt+1∫∫
(−pst(−νt+1)1−ρ + (1− pst)k b
1−ρ
t+1
1−ρ )ϕ(Rt+1, Ht+1)dRt+1dHt+1 if t ≥ K
(24)
If housing shocks and retirement income shocks are combined the expectation oper-
ator for the retirement period changes to
∫∫∫
(−pst(−νt+1)1−ρ + (1− pst)k b
1−ρ
t+1
1−ρ )· if t ≥ K
ϕ(Ut+1, Rt+1, Ht+1)dUt+1dRt+1dHt+1
(25)
For the medical consumption shock we have to introduce another binary state vari-
able I. The medical consumption shock leads to a permanent reduction in retirement
income with a certain probability. In total, we have four state variables: normalized
cash on hand, normalized annuity payouts, medical consumption state, and age.
The new binary state variable is (I = 1) in case the medical consumption shock has
occurred and is zero otherwise. In order to attain the value function from the future
period, we use 4 dimensional cubic-splines inter(extra-)polation. Let ψ denote the
probability that the medical consumption shock occurs. If no medical consumption
shock has occurred previously (I = 0), then the expectation operator in retirement
can be written as a weighted sum
ψ
∫
(−pst(−νt+1)1−ρ + (1− pst)k b
1−ρ
t+1
1−ρ )ϕ(Rt+1)dRt+1
+(1− ψ) ∫ (−pst(−νt+1)1−ρ + (1− pst)k b1−ρt+11−ρ )ϕ(Rt+1)dRt+1 (26)
If the medical consumption shock has already occurred (I = 1) previously, the
expectation operator for retirement period can be stated as in (22). Then the optimal
policies and the value function are given by pia(w; l; I; t), pis(w; l; I; t), a(w; l; I; t),
c(w; l; I; t), and v(w; l; I; t), respectively. If we add health shocks, we need to replace
the subjective survival probabilities in the expectation operator by lower survival
probabilities for the case that a medical shock occurs or has occurred.
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